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Abstract
Environmental problems are said to be research dependent, as science is needed to 
identify phenomena such as climate change for example. New technological cures 
can  however  be  characterised  both  by  research  dependence  and  by  scientific 
uncertainty. One example is biofuels. A few years back, biofuels were seen as a 
sustainable  solution  to  the  transport  sector's  carbon dioxide  emissions  and oil 
dependence. Since then, they have become widely questioned on the grounds of 
emission savings and adverse environmental impacts. 
The European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive on renewable 
energy, including a binding 10 % target for biofuels, in the beginning of 2008. 
The Council and European Parliament agreed on an outcome in late December the 
same year. This thesis uses process tracing to investigate the potential influence of 
voiced scientific criticism regarding biofuels on the legislative process. 
Literature  regarding  the  role  of  science  in  policy-making is  reviewed,  and 
hypotheses are derived regarding the possible effects of scientific uncertainty. The 
results imply that uncertainty regarding biofuels' costs and benefits was not able to 
affect the policy outcome, but that it had a certain impact on the EU institutions 
during the political process. 
Ca. 10400 words.
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1. Introduction
Regulation of risks to health and the environment,  in particular,  involves issues at  the 
frontiers of current scientific knowledge, where consensus among scientists is most fragile. 
(Jasanoff 1987: 197)
Policy-making normally involves value based choices, negotiations, compromises 
between  different  interests  and  the  ability  to  publicly  legitimize  decisions. 
However, in technical issues at the brink of human knowledge, we often prefer 
politics to be guided by expert advice. Environmental problems for example, are 
characterized by their research dependence; as they cannot be sensed or seen, we 
need scientists to enlighten us about their existence and call for regulation. The 
debate is directed by the scientists' findings and science becomes the ombudsman 
of the environment (Bäckstrand 2001: 18, Sundqvist 1991: 8, 67). Empirically, 
scientific evidence has already led to political acknowledgement of the existence 
of ozone holes and climate change. It has been accepted that these phenomena are 
caused by human activity and protocols have been set up to rectify them. Both 
events have shown the potential influence of scientific consensus on the political 
scene. 
Something that is often less recognized is that we depend on science not only 
for identification of environmental problems, but for knowledge of how to deal 
with them. Causes are identified and knowledge and technology are developed 
and evaluated.  In this  area,  the scientific  consensus is  often weaker.  Research 
takes time,  and many of the technologies intended to fight  climate change for 
example, are still at a research or a pilot stage1. Some solutions have already been 
introduced,  but  the  consequences  of  applying  them on  a  larger  scale  are  not 
immediately  known.  Hence,  possible  solutions  to  environmental  problems  are 
often characterized both by research dependence and by scientific uncertainty. 
New technology  is  sometimes  included  in  legislation  in  spite  of  potential 
uncertainties, due to urgency and high public expectations. The result is regulation 
to limit risks to health and environment, on the brink of scientific knowledge, just 
as  in  the  citation  above.  According  to  Corell  (1999:  26),  it's  important  to 
investigate how, and from what source, authority and legitimacy are gained when 
policy  decisions  are  made  under  conditions  of  scientific  uncertainty.  It's  also 
important to investigate whether increased scientific uncertainty can affect policy-
making and possibly lead to policy-change. 
1 Examples include hydrogen fuel cells for cars and technicues for carbon capture and storage. 
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1.1 Research question and relevance
A few years ago, biofuels for transport were perceived as a sustainable kind of 
renewable  energy.  Today,  they  are  said  to  be  expensive,  to  have  uncertain 
greenhouse  gas  balances  and  to  increase  the  pressure  on  land  and  water 
resources2.  In spite of the scientific uncertainty regarding the cost and benefit of 
an increased usage, the European Commission suggested an ambitious target of 10 
% of transport energy to come from biofuels by 2020. The proposal provoked 
concern from the start,  and outright  criticism followed.  Some of this criticism 
stemmed from scientific  communities,  arguing that  the  uncertainties  regarding 
climate and environment effects were too large, recommending a suspension of 
the target. 
The research question guiding this thesis is  what role the voiced scientific 
uncertainty  and criticism  played  in the  making of  the  EU biofuels  policy and 
whether or not this affected the outcome. The issue of why is also relevant, as this 
would  help  us  understand  under  what  conditions  science  can  be  influential. 
Science is often viewed as an important source of legitimacy for politics, making 
the consequences of uncertainty well worth looking into. 
The issue of whether and under which conditions scientific uncertainty can 
influence a policy-process, and perhaps even lead to policy-change, is of general 
interest.  The aim of this thesis is therefore to contribute to theoretical  insights 
regarding such processes.  
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The following chapter will offer a brief overview of what biofuels are, in order to 
clarify the complexity of the technology and hence of regulating it politically. In 
Chapter  3,  literature  regarding  the  role  of  science  in  policy-making  will  be 
reviewed, offering two views from which hypotheses can be derived regarding the 
ability of scientific uncertainty to affect the proposal for a biofuels directive. This 
will  be  followed  by  a  brief  discussion  of  the  research  design  and  method  of 
process-tracing. In Chapter 5, the documents related to the legislative process, the 
criticism raised and the EU-institutions’ responses will be reviewed. By the end of 
the thesis, the research question will be revisited and the hypotheses re-examined. 
2 See Chapter 2.2 and 5 for more information. 
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2.  Biofuels for transport 
Biofuels are a form of renewable energy, defined as ”Liquid or gaseous fuel for 
transport produced from biomass” (Commission 2006a: 17). Biomass refers to the 
biodegradable fraction of waste, residues and products from agriculture, forestry 
and related industries, and the biodegradable fraction of industrial and municipal 
waste (Ibid). Biomass can be used for other purposes than liquid fuel production. 
With the techniques available today, twice as much energy can be harvested per 
hectare of land, if the grown biomass is used to make heat and electricity instead 
of biofuel (Börjesson 2007: 128). 
The  biofuels  that  are  commercially  available  today are  so  called  first 
generation biofuels.  Biodiesel is easiest to make from rapeseed. Waste oils can 
also be used, but exist in a limited supply. Bioethanol is made by conventional 
fermentation and distillation of sugar and starch, from sugar beet, wheat, barley or 
maize.  In sunnier countries,  sugar cane provides for cheaper and more energy 
efficient  bioethanol  (van  der  Laak  et  al.  2007:  3214). Both  bioethanol  and 
biodiesel  compete  with  food  production.  Their  advantage  is  that  they  can  be 
distributed through the existing infrastructure and used in low-percentage blends 
with conventional fuels in most vehicles (Commission 2006a: 5). 
Making biogas from anaerobic digestion of wet  manure and organic waste 
saves greenhouse gas emissions as it avoids methane release. The by-product can 
be used as  a  natural  fertilizer  (Nordberg 2007:  188f).  To use biogas  for  road 
transport  is  however  costly  as  the  gas  must  be  purified,  and  require  special 
vehicles and fuel pumps. So far biogas is used in transport only in Sweden (AEA 
Technology plc. 2008: v). In other countries, it substitutes imported natural gas, 
from Russia for example. 
Second generation biofuels typically emit much less greenhouse gas than first 
generation fuels and can be made from almost any form of biomass3, decreasing 
the risk of competing with food production. However, these biofuels only exist on 
a pilot plant stage, and the technology is extremely expensive and complex (De 
Santi 2007: 7).
2.1 Biofuels in the EU
According to Jensen (2008) the main challenge for the transport sector is that its 
energy source must  be easy to carry,  making liquid and oil  based alternatives 
attractive. Biofuels have been discussed as an alternative in the EU, since the late 
1980s. In 2001, the Commission identified biofuels, natural gas, and hydrogen as 
3 Sugar can for example be extracted from cellulose in woody material, using fermentation.
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the main  fuel  alternatives.  These were believed to be able to  achieve a  20 % 
substitution of conventional fuels by 2020 (Commission, 2008c: 52). Two years 
later legislation followed, as Directive 2003/30/EC required all Member States to 
set national indicative targets for the use of biofuels. The Commission’s reference 
values were 2 percent use by 2005 and 5,75 percent by 20104 (Ibid: 52). At this 
time, biofuels were hailed by environmental groups who foresaw a revolution in 
green  motoring.  For  the  EU,  the  driving  force  is  said  to  have  been  “grain 
mountains” and payments to farmers for set-aside land (Renewable Fuels Agency 
2008: 8). 
In 2006, as transport emissions rose to 21 %, it became clear that only half of 
the target for 2005 had been fulfilled. The failing implementation of voluntary 
targets, and high oil dependence and emission levels, motivated the Commission 
to  propose  legislation  for  a  binding  target  (Commission,  2006b:  7,  10, 
Commission, 2006a: 3). 
2.2 Reasons for scientific concerns 
The costs  and benefits of first  generation biofuels  are linked to which crop is 
grown, where and how it's  grown, what energy source is  used during the fuel 
production and whether the by-products are used as animal feed or not (De Santi 
2007: 6). Environmental risks involve soil erosion and threat to water resources 
and biodiversity.  These problems can to some degree be met  by sustainability 
requirements,  regulating  where  biofuels  can  be  grown  for  example.  Biofuels' 
ability  to  decrease  greenhouse  gas  emissions  has  also  been  questioned. 
Fertilization, leading to nitrous oxide emissions, can partly negate carbon dioxide 
savings (Crutzen et al. 2007). Imported biofuels can in the worst case contribute 
to increased emissions, as biofuel crops displace food crops, possibly leading to 
sensitive and carbon rich lands being farmed. This indirect land use change is not 
well researched yet and there is no consensus on how to measure it, making it 
impossible to regulate (Jensen 2008).
Overall, the benefit of bioenergy is not questioned. What is questioned is the 
choice to use a limited supply of biomass for transport fuel. There is scientific 
consensus  about  higher  greenhouse  gas  savings  being  achievable  through 
alternative  usage  of  biomass  (Ibid).  Scientific  uncertainty  regarding  the 
environmental  risks,  climate  effects  and methodology for  regulating  causes  of 
concern,  lead  to  diverging  conclusions.  Some,  mainly  non-environmental, 
scientists  and  experts  argue  that  the  transport  sector's  emissions  need  to  be 
tackled,  while others claim that biofuels are not the solution. In the following 
parts, it's  mainly the possible influence of the environment and climate related 
uncertainty that is of interest5. 
4  It was calculated that achieving these targets could result in greenhouse gas savings of between 
0.3 and 1% of EU CO2 emissions.
5   As the aim is to investigate the influence of science on politics and not the other way around, the 
distinction between science and scientists is of little relevance and will not be discussed.  
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3. Theory of science and politics
According to Kingdon (2003: 2f), the process of public policy-making begins with 
the  setting  of  an  agenda and  the  specification  of  policy  alternatives,  before  a 
decision is made and implemented. The agenda can be influenced by processes 
such as the occurrence of a problem, or the realisation that a policy is not working 
as intended (Ibid: 90, 100). Economic and political factors, such as support from 
voters and societal actors, may be influential, provided that they are perceived by 
decision-makers  (Gustavsson  1998:  23f).  When  a  condition  is  defined  as  a 
problem, some groups will be helped and others not, depending on what policy 
alternatives are identified.  The alternatives may be influenced or obstructed by 
business and NGOs because of their ability to influence economic activity and 
mobilize people (Kingdon 2005: Ch. 2-3). Strategies are employed to frame issues 
in advantageous ways and to persuade and manipulate others into accepting a new 
policy. Timing, strategic leadership, availability of alternative strategies and the 
possible occurrence of a crisis may facilitate policy-change (Gustavsson 1998: 24, 
26f, 177). The question is what role science plays in all of this. 
According to Kingdon (2003: 55), science has primarily a role to play in the 
formulation of policy alternatives, as politicians turn to the research community 
for proposals and possible solutions.  Legislation in the environmental field may 
however be different. Some argue that research dependence implies that scientific 
expertise ought to exert greater influence over how environmental problems are 
defined and what measures are taken to remedy them (Corell 1999: 26). To others, 
research  dependence  implies  a  politization  of  science,  increasing  numbers  of 
experts and of controversies and disagreements amongst them. It's therefore seen 
as a democratic dilemma to hand over more responsibility to experts (Bäckstrand 
2001: 22, Sundqvist 1991: 15). Below, two views on science and the implications 
of scientific uncertainty will be summarised. 
3.1 Autonomous science advising policy
In the traditional view, science and  politics exist in separate realms, one being 
based on facts and the other on values. Science is seen as a value-neutral source of 
information,  available  for  policy-makers  to  consult  in  order  to  make  their 
decisions more rational (Bäckstrand 2001: 53). Science illuminates and assists and 
potential problems are attributed to the public's lack of scientific understanding 
(Irwin – Wynne 1996: 4, 6).  According to this view, science holds a special kind 
of authority, as scientists are perceived to possess technical knowledge, based on 
objective  data  and  scientifically  accepted  methods  (Sundqvist  1991:  134). 
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Government officials and other agents can legitimize policy decisions by referring 
to the authority of science, as science is seen as ”speaking truth”.  Empirically, 
many public institutions and bureaucracies trust in the  neutral expert,  and will 
thus regard science as the most important ally in policy-making (Sundqvist 1991: 
144, 182). 
Science  receives  a  certain  status  from  its  advisory  role,  but  its  cognitive 
authority may also be threatened by too much involvement in the political realm, 
if its autonomous characteristic is jeopardised (Jasanoff 1987: 197). Science risks 
being  ”reduced  to  just  another  interest  group”  and  scientists  who  enter  the 
political sphere might suffer delegitimation among peers (Bäckstrand 2001: 25, 
58). 
As the view of separate realms has come under attack, there have been efforts 
to talk about  trans-  or regulatory science,  as a hybrid of science and politics. In 
this  view,  evaluating  and  assessing  existing  scientific  knowledge,  as  when 
research experts translate scientific findings to the policy community, is different 
from the actual knowledge production (Ibid: 26f, 60). The purpose of such activity 
can however still be to provide neutral knowledge input to policy-makers, while 
allowing the scientific realm to remain separate and authoritative.
Following this view of science, it can be problematic with uncertainty and lack 
of scientific consensus. For the scientific community itself, public disagreement 
over the interpretation of data challenges the view of science as a disinterested 
search for truth, as virtually any reading of the evidence becomes possible and 
may appear to be influenced by political interests (Jasanoff 1987: 195, 198). For 
the political  sphere,  large  uncertainties  make science unable  to  illuminate  and 
assist the policy-making process. Decisions become harder to legitimize as they 
may appear guided by narrow interests and not by knowledge and rationality. 
If  a  situation  would  arise,  in  which  legislation  was  necessary  in  spite  of 
uncertain  science,  the  precautionary  principle6 states  that  lack  of  decisive 
evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing regulation (Sunstein 2005: 
18).  Such  a  recommendation  would  however  still  be  expected  to  build  on 
compiled scientific evidence and most likely stem from the scientific community 
itself.   
Based on this overview, one could hypothesize that occurrence of scientific 
uncertainty would be a serious challenge for a biofuels policy. Referral to the need 
to act on climate change would not defend a policy tool which has been openly 
criticized  by  the  scientific  community.  The  policy  proposal  would  thus  lack 
legitimacy,  and the decision-makers, i.e. the European Parliament and Council, 
would be inclined to change it in answer to the criticism. A first hypothesis would 
thus  be that  the  voiced scientific  uncertainty  and critique  would  influence the 
policy process and lead to a directive which is substantially different from the 
original proposal. Section 3.3 will explain how influence and policy-change can 
be understood in order to evaluate such a hypothesis. 
6 Empirically, the principle was endorsed at the Rio Earth Summit meeting in 1992 and in a 
Commission communication from 2000 (Joint Nature Conservation Committee 2008). 
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3.2 Science in the absence of truths
In a situation characterised by high decision stakes, large system uncertainties and 
intense  value-disputes,  the  superiority  and  neutrality  of  scientific  advice  are 
questioned. Science cannot offer truth,  as truth is  something that is born from 
debate and controversy7. Instead of being separate realms, science and politics are 
seen as  mutually  constructed  (Bäckstrand 2001:  53f,  60).  By decision-makers, 
science  may  be  perceived  as  an  ally  amongst  others,  rather  than  the  most 
important  ally. Alternatively,  out of disappointment  with the lack of verifiable 
truths, scientists are seen as entrepreneurs and partisans and not as allies at all 
(Sundqvist 1991: 182, 187f). 
Publicly however, science may still be used to legitimize policies. Even anti-
establishment organisations such as Greenpeace, draw increasingly on scientific 
authority  (Yearley  1996:  175,  186f).  The  result  is  a  deconstruction  and 
reconstruction of knowledge claims,  as scientists,  public officials  and political 
interest  groups  all  have  a  stake in determining how policy-relevant  science is 
interpreted  (Jasanoff  1987:  195).  Science  becomes  a  reservoir  from  which 
different actors select and present causal stories, presenting scenarios that promote 
or  prevent  policy  change  as  the  story-lines  are  transformed  into  authoritative 
discourses (Bäckstrand 2001: 75, 254f). Legitimacy becomes connected with the 
ability to reconstruct a plausible scientific rationale for a proposed action, and 
facts are accepted as authoritative not necessarily because they can be empirically 
verified, but because they are validated through informal negotiation and ranged 
into frameworks of shared assumptions (Jasanoff 1987: 195). The scientific story 
presented to the public is  thus finally a creation of the political  process (Ibid: 
197f).  Politicians  may  even  try  to  picture  an  issue  as  technical  rather  than 
political, as the answer will appear more neutral, leaving the critics to point to the 
scientific  uncertainty  and  ideological  choices  involved  (Sundqvist  1991:  134, 
170). 
In the face of strong political consensus, it's therefore likely that policy goals 
will be pursued independently of the knowledge base. Science risks being reduced 
to a role of legitimizing already favoured policies as politicians choose between 
expert claims (Bäckstrand 2001: 58, Sundqvist 1991: 143). Scientific uncertainty 
is thus not an obstacle for policy-making. Lack of scientific consensus may even 
be  an  advantage,  as  there  will  be  more  expert  views  to  pick  from.  Scientific 
evidence will not be seen as authoritative, but something that can be framed8 into 
legitimizing a policy. 
For the scientists, controversies open up new work fields and increases, rather 
than decreases, the demand for experts. Scientists who politicize their results don't 
lose but gain in authority, as they are more useful to the debate than scientists in 
their ivory-towers (Sundqvist 1991: 144f, 188).  
7 Quality assurance of science should thus be enhanced through democratization of science, by 
involving NGOs, industry, public and media in the scientific assessment (Bäckstrand 2001: 61).
8 Frames are constructed to sell or market policies to citizens. Previous studies confirm that public 
opinion depends on how elites choose to frame issues (McBeth - Shanahan, 2004: 320, 333). 
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A second hypothesis, based on this view, would be that scientific uncertainty 
regarding  biofuels  should  not  affect  policy-making  in  any  significant  way. 
Decision-makers  would  not  change  a  preferred  policy  proposal  because  of 
scientific criticism, as long as other expert claims could be found to construct a 
plausible  scientific  rationale  in  support  of  the  policy.  If  other  groups  were 
supportive,  it  would  be  especially  unlikely  that  science  would  exercise  any 
particular  influence,  as  other  allies  and  sources  of  legitimacy  would  then  be 
available.
3.3 How to measure the influence of science 
Influence  is  linked  to  power,  but  different  from  control,  coercion,  force  or 
interference. It involves affecting the conduct of another through giving reasons 
for action. If successful, the influence will alter the receiver’s actions from what 
would have occurred without the transmitted information. The influenced agent 
however  acts  freely  and  may  choose  to  ignore  the  information  (Corell  1999: 
101ff). 
Corell  suggests  that  indicators  of  non-state  actor  influence  can  be  the 
opportunity  to  present  written  or  verbal  information  to  policy-makers  or 
negotiators, or to be able to offer specific advice (Ibid: 107). This information 
may however be ignored. Direct referral to the information supplied during the 
policy process, would be a more certain indication of the information having been 
taken into consideration. 
For the influence to be successful, one would however expect some kind of 
effect in the direction indicated by the influencing actor.  Gustavsson (1998: 22) 
discusses  policy-change,  arguing  that  one  can distinguish  between  minor 
adjustments, a change in the means of a policy, a change in the goals and possibly 
problem formulation, and a change of the entire orientation of the policy9. 
I will apply the same reasoning to the biofuels case, arguing that for scientific 
uncertainty to be successfully influential, it would be expected to contribute to an 
outcome that is different from the initial policy proposal. The change would have 
to be more substantial than minor adjustments or  cosmetic changes of wordings. 
The least to expect would be a change in the means of the biofuels policy, for 
example regarding how to reach the target or the methodology for how and what 
to count against the target. A change in the goal of the policy would correspond to 
a change of the 10 % target to a lesser level, while a change in the orientation of 
the policy would correspond to its suspension. 
Both  hypotheses  above,  assume  that  the  scientific  objections  towards  the 
policy are known. This can be verified through empirical evidence that scientific 
sources supplied information or specific advice to the EU-institutions. For the first 
hypothesis to be true, the scientific information would moreover have had to be 
seriously  considered  and  found  to  be  problematic.  Referral  to  scientific 
9 Gustavsson uses these categories to describe change in foreign policy, but they can be useful also 
for other policy areas.
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uncertainty or  the criticism voiced by the scientific  community as  reasons  for 
changing strategy,  would support  this  view.  For  science to have  succeeded  in 
influencing the policy, it would finally be expected that its arguments led to a 
substantial  change  in  the  policy  finally  agreed  upon  compared  to  the  initial 
proposal. 
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4. The making of a case study
The  following  chapter  will  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  methodological 
reasoning guiding this thesis, in order to discuss the implications for the quality 
and results.  
4.1 Research design and choice of case
According  to  George  and  Bennett  (2005:  18),  case  studies  have  often  been 
criticized,  as it's  argued that  generalizations are not possible on the basis of a 
small  number  of  cases.  They  are  however  useful  for  testing  hypotheses  and 
develop theory, as it's possible to closely examine the role of causal mechanisms 
and to address causal complexity.  Case studies may not be able to assess how 
much a variable mattered, but help us assess whether and how it mattered  (Ibid: 
25). In the light of my research question, a case study design would thus seem 
appropriate. 
A case can be defined as an instance of a class of events, where the term 'class 
of events' refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest (Ibid: 17). In the study at 
hand, the legislative process following the proposal for a biofuels target, is seen as 
an instance of EU policy-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. The latter 
can be seen as a phenomenon of interest to political science as it would increase 
our knowledge of what role science actually plays in policy-making. By  testing 
hypotheses  generated  from  literature  on  this  area  on  an  empirical  case,  new 
insights can be gained of how and why science may influence politics. 
The biofuels case could be seen as a  typical case (see Esaiasson et al. 2005: 
183)  as  it  does  not  deviate  systematically  from any other  case of  EU policy-
making when science is uncertain. The main advantage of the case is however that 
it's contemporary. As the outcome of the policy process was not determined until 
late December 2008, the choice of case has not been unconsciously guided by any 
wish to confirm a certain hypothesis or theoretical point. It's thus as close to a live 
experiment as I could get. 
As noted by George and Bennett (2005: 90f),  any case explanation is of a 
provisional character,  and alternative explanations for the case outcome should 
always be considered. Generation of preliminary theoretical insights will therefore 
be the aim of this thesis, and not generalizations.
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4.2 Method and material
According to Lindgren (2008: 114), qualitative methods are suitable when the aim 
is  to  describe  social  phenomenon,  relations  and processes  in  order  to  develop 
knowledge of things less known. As the thesis will look at the development of the 
biofuels case, from proposal to agreement, a qualitative process tracing method 
will be used. Process tracing can take the form of a detailed narrative or story 
presented in the form of a chronicle intended to throw light on how an event came 
about.  In a  more analytical  form, this narrative is  accompanied by hypotheses 
regarding the specific case (George – Bennett 2005: 210f, 217). In the case at 
hand, it will be necessary to show that scientific uncertainty was voiced prior to 
and during the policy process, with the aim of identifying a possible influence 
over the different EU institutions. The effects on the EU institutions may however 
be independent of each other.
In the process tracing, it will also be of interest to pay attention to how the 
biofuel issue is talked about; how it's  framed.  Frames constitute a discourse that 
helps political actors sell policy choices to the public by making them politically 
and culturally acceptable (Béland 2005: 11). Frames are interesting as they can 
say something about how policies are legitimized.  
The  actual  work  will  consist  of  reviewing  the  documents  relevant  to  the 
decision-making procedure: the proposal, opinions, proposed amendments, press-
releases etc., as well as documents from scientific sources. Referral to science and 
expertise and especially arguments concerning to scientific uncertainty, as well as 
a  lack of  such,  will  be sought.  At  the time of  the  final  agreement,  it  will  be 
relevant to compare the text of the directive with that of the initial proposal, in 
order to evaluate if any substantial changes have been agreed to or not. 
As the biofuels issue gave rise to intense debates in the UK during 2008, this 
Member State may appear more often in the material. This is not the reflection of 
a methodological choice, but a consequence of the empirical situation.
The material consists of the first hand documents, reports and press releases 
relevant to the legislative process10. Two interviews were also made with Jan-Erik 
Petersen and Peder Jensen, who both work on the biofuel subject at the European 
Environment  Agency  (EEA).  The  purpose  of  these  interviews  was  to  gain 
supplementary information about the scientific view on biofuels and the ability of 
the  EEA  to  offer  information  and  advice  to  policy-makers.  More  interviews 
should preferably have been made. As the intention is not to analyse the answers, 
but  rather  to  access  supplementary  information,  the  number  of  interviews  is 
however not a methodological problem. Esaiasson et al. (2005: 314) suggest that 
as a rule of thumb one can accept the main story lines in a material if the source is 
not suspected to be biased. It's also likely that information is correctly reflected, if 
it is found in more than one independent source. The risk of having a validity 
problem, is therefore judged to be small.
10 A couple of Commission documents were however not available, as they are covered by an 
exception provided for by Regulation No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
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5. Tracing the biofuels policy process
The need for a binding biofuels target entered the Commission's agenda as a result 
of emission and oil-dependence problems, as the 2003 directive did not work as 
intended. This is in accordance with Kingdon's reasoning regarding the political 
agenda,  mentioned in Chapter  3.  A public consultation by the Commission  in 
2006,  indicated  a  wide  support  for  a  continued  promotion  of  biofuels,  with  a 
mandatory fixed target as the favoured option in a majority of the answers11. All 
industrial stakeholders were positive, as were the Member States (Londo et al. 
2006: 4f). The agricultural sector saw a chance to secure future subsidies and was 
therefore very supportive of biofuels (Jensen 2008). NGOs were more sceptical, 
arguing that promotion of biofuels wouldn't necessarily achieve the EU's policy 
objectives,  i.e.  greenhouse  gas  reductions,  security  of  supply  and  rural 
development.  A thorough assessment  of biofuels'  sustainability  was suggested, 
and a preference for a target set by greenhouse gas  reductions, rather than by 
volume, was indicated (Londo et al. 2006: 4f, 8, 19). 
Petersen (2008) suggests that the lack of scientific evidence at this time, made 
it hard for sceptical NGOs to be critical of biofuels. The first findings of the EEA 
did not offer much reason for doubt. A 2006 EEA report found that up to 15-16 
per  cent  of  energy  demand  in  2030,  could  be  covered  by  environmentally 
compatible bioenergy based on EU resources (EEA 2006: 6). The number was 
surprisingly  high  and  got  a  lot  of  political  and  media  attention,  whereas  the 
underlying assumptions and restrictions were less cited (Petersen 2008). 
There was a lot of enthusiasm for biofuels in 2005, 2006 and even 2007 (Ibid), 
and the attitudes towards biofuels seem to have been mainly positive at this point 
of time. It's therefore not surprising that  the Commission, on the 10th of January 
2007, suggested the development of a directive for renewable energy, including a 
10  %  biofuels  target. The  question  is  whether  the  objections  which  were  to 
emerge would have any effect on the legislative process. 
5.1 Prevailing consensus in 2007
The proposal for a directive was endorsed by the heads of state at the European 
Council in March, when it was agreed that: ”The binding character of this target is 
appropriate  subject  to  production being sustainable,  second-generation biofuels 
becoming commercially available and the Fuel Quality Directive being amended 
accordingly to allow for adequate levels of blending.” (European Council 2007: 
11  All in all 144 responses were received, whereof 83 were from industry/private sector, 26 from 
NGOs and the rest from private citizens, Member States and institutions. 
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21). A few months later, in September, the European Parliament adopted a report 
supporting the 10 % target, calling on the Commission to present a proposal for a 
legislative  framework  (Thomsen 2007:  11).  Hence,  there  would  seem to have 
been political consensus on the appropriateness of introducing a high, mandatory 
biofuels target. 
Both the Council  and Parliament mentioned the need for sustainability,  but 
there was no real referral to any risks or uncertainties, apart from the European 
Parliament's call for a fair balance between food and energy production12. In the 
meantime,  the  Commission  issued  a  new  consultation  procedure,  this  time 
regarding the setting up of a sustainability scheme and other measures needed to 
implement a 10 % target. 
A more critical voice however appeared by the end of 2007, as MEP Eija-
Riitta Korhola posted a written question to the Council and Commission, asking 
whether  an  EU biofuel  policy  was  still  realistic,  and  in  line  with  sustainable 
development  criteria.  To  support  her  question,  Korhola  referred  to  an  OECD 
report  entitled  Biofuels:  is  the  cure  worse  than  the  disease? and  a  Science 
magazine article with the title  Carbon Mitigation by Biofuels or by Saving and 
Restoring  Forests?.  First  generation  biofuels  were  suggested  to  be  equally 
harmful to the climate as conventional fuels,  while second generation biofuels 
“are undeveloped and unrealistically expensive” (Korhola 2007a, 2007b). 
5.2 A proposal for a Directive in 2008
In January 2008, a report by the Environmental Audit Committee of the British 
House of Commons, concluded that certification of biofuels would be inadequate 
in addressing the negative impacts of biofuels. It was claimed that Stavros Dimas, 
the EU Environment Commissioner, had admitted that the Commission did not 
foresee all  the problems that  an EU biofuels  policy would cause13.  The report 
suggested that:  
The [British]  Government  should  seek to  ensure  that  EU policy changes  to  reflect  the 
concerns raised in this report. This means implementing a moratorium on current targets 
until technology improves, robust mechanisms to prevent damaging land use change are 
developed, and international sustainability standards are agreed. Only then might biofuels 
have a role to play. In the meantime, other more effective ways of cutting emissions from 
road transport should be pursued.
(Environmental Audit Committee 2008a: 3) 
In response to the critique,  Energy Commissioner  Andris Piebalgs strongly 
disagreed with the Committee's conclusion. It was argued that the only alternative 
12The food prices had increased throughout 2007 (see FAO 2008) and biofuels were slowly getting 
attention for being a possible cause.
13 In a later response, the Committee also refered to the precautionary principle as an argument for 
suspending further increases in the biofuels use (Environmental Audit Committee 2008b: 7).
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to  biofuels  was oil,  and that  the 10 % target  would pave the way for second 
generation biofuels (Europa 2008d). The risk of investing in a technology that 
may not be the more efficient in the future, was thus not seen as a problem.
On the 23 of January, the Commission presented its proposal for a legislative 
text on renewable fuels to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The proposal 
was part of a package on climate and energy measures, intended to achieve 20 % 
renewable energy and 20 % emission reduction14 by the year  of 2020 (Europa 
2008b). By this time, scientists' and experts' concerns had reached all the way up 
to the EU institutions. The Commission's Joint Research Centre's (JRC)15 report 
Biofuels in the European Context: Facts and Uncertainties,  was prepared as a 
contribution to the proposal, and stated that: 
The uncertainties  of  the emissions due to indirect  effects,  much of  which would occur 
outside the EU, mean that it is impossible to say with certainty that the net [greenhouse gas] 
effects of the biofuels programme would be positive. 
(De Santi 2008: 22)
The report claimed that biomass would save more fossil fuel and emissions if used 
in other sectors, and that it was unlikely that second generation biofuels would be 
competitive  by  2020  (Ibid:  7). Certification  was  moreover  regarded  as  an 
insufficient solution, as an effective certification scheme would have to apply to 
all consumer countries and include food products, in order to avoid displacement 
effects. It would take time and initially lead to a shortage of certified products 
(Ibid: 11). Finally, the positive effect of a biofuels policy on security of supply 
was judged to be small compared to costs, while the net employment effect would 
be insignificant (Ibid: 22f). 
It's possible that the critique was influential.  It's known that the  policy was 
subject  to  internal  controversy  in  the  Commission,  with  the  Environment  DG 
being sceptical while DG Energy and Transport (TREN) ”made the other DGs 
accept the proposal” (Petersen 2008). As will be shown in section 5.2.1, there was 
however  little  official  recognition  of  contradictory  views.  In  any  case,  the 
proposed text suggested sustainability criteria, such as only biofuels saving 35 % 
emissions compared to conventional  fuels being counted towards the target.  A 
number of requirements related to biodiversity were also to be respected, in order 
to prevent the use of land with high biodiversity value, such as natural forests and 
protected areas (Europa 2008c). 
The  reactions  in  the  European  Parliament  at  the  Strasbourg  session,  were 
cautions or sceptical. The appointed rapporteur for the  Committee on Industry, 
Research  and  Energy  (ITRE),  green  MEP  Claude  Turmes,  accused  the 
Commission of lacking the courage to drop the biofuels target, citing scientific 
evidence showing the many biofuel crops have a very bad CO2-balance (EP Live 
2008, European Parliament 27/08/2008: 2). 
14 Compared to the 1990 levels, to be increased to 30 % in case of an international agreement.
15 The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the 
conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies.
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The Commission's opinion however seemed steadfast. In February, Piebalgs 
wrote that ”The Commission's position on biofuels has not changed.”, in response 
to the written questions by MEP Korhola. The findings referred to by Korhola 
were  questioned  and  it  was  concluded  that  the  measures  specified  in  the 
legislative  proposal  would  ensure  that  biofuels  would  meet  minimum 
environmental  sustainability  standards  (Piebalgs  2008).  The  Council's  (2008) 
answer showed no will  of taking a stand on the issue, simply referring to the 
conclusions of the 2007 Spring European Council. During the spring, the Czech 
Republic however demanded certification to include criteria for sustainable use of 
water  sources,  arguing  that  existing  regulation  was  inadequate.  The  opinion 
referred to an OECD report of September 2007, severely criticising the use of 
biofuels,  as  their  cultivation  caused  frequent  fatal  interference  with  the  water 
supply systems in some third world countries  (General secretariat of the Council 
2008c: 10). 
5.2.1 Legitimizing the biofuels policy
The main reasons stated for the 10 % target, were the growing emissions and oil 
dependence of the transport sector, and the fact that biofuels will not be developed 
without a specific requirement due to high costs (Commission,  2008a: 8).  The 
frequent  mentioning  of  Europe's  oil-dependence  and  lack  of  alternative 
technological solutions, show that climate concern was not the sole motive for the 
policy. The compatibility of these different motives is questionable, but this is not 
commented on by the Commission.   
 The  proposal  is  based  on  a  thorough  impact  assessment  and  widespread 
stakeholder consultation. Several consulted experts are mentioned, although only 
one report dealt with biofuels, and only with regards to food price impacts (see 
Commission,  2008a: 5f).  Referral to research experts and scenarios modelling, 
shows that such factors are important for knowledge and legitimacy. According to 
Jensen  (2008),  the  Commission  is  happy  to  build  on  science,  but  needs  the 
solutions to work “in the real world”. In this case it would seem that scientific 
uncertainty regarding the biofuel solution was unable to change the Commission's 
mind about the merits of the policy. 
Even  though  expertise  is  referred  to,  there's  no  extensive  discussion  of 
scientific evidence and potential uncertainties. Instead, the proposal is framed as 
largely unproblematic and filled with win-win rhetoric. Biofuels are said to offer 
opportunities for development countries and for job creation in the EU, a chance 
to improve trade relations, boost innovation and to maintain Europe's competitive 
position in the renewable energy sector (Commission 2008b: 125). The listing of 
potential socio-economic benefits, contribute to the image of  science not being 
regarded as the only thinkable ally or source of legitimacy for the policy. 
Certain risks are mentioned,  but not considered grave.  In the annex to the 
impact assessment it's for example noted that: 
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The rise in prices of agricultural products should benefit farmers and rural communities, 
notably in developing countries. It could be detrimental to poorer populations. However, it 
should be underlined that 70% of the world's poor are also rural, and hence can also be 
among the beneficiary group of rising agricultural prices. 
(Commission 2008b: 125)
Biofuels are thus a potential solution to the developing world's poverty problem, 
rather than a risk. The fact that individual farmers are vulnerable, and may be 
unable to reap the benefits of the mentioned development, is ignored. On the same 
page it's noted that: 
If increased biofuel use leads to feedstock being grown on land that is inappropriate – such 
as  natural  forest  and  other  habitats  of  high  nature  value  –  it  will  cause  substantial 
environmental damage. There is no need to use this land to achieve a 14% biofuel share.
The fact that there is no agreed definition of what is inappropriate land is not 
discussed,  and  neither  is  the  impossibility  of  controlling  which  land  will  be 
farmed in countries outside the EU. Certification is presented as the solution to 
most problems, in spite of the fact that exporting countries may prefer to trade 
with less scrupulous countries16. 
5.3 Scientific critique and rising food prices 
During 2008, the critical arguments regarding biofuels got the upper hand in the 
public  debate  and in the  press  (Petersen  2008).  On the  10th  of  April,  biofuels 
certainly  made  headlines  as  the  EEA's  Scientific  Committee17 issued  a  public 
opinion criticising the EU biofuels policy:  
The overambitious  10 % biofuel  target  is  an  experiment,  whose unintended  effects  are 
difficult to predict and difficult to control. Therefore the Scientific Committee recommends 
suspending  the  10  % goal;  carrying  out  a  new,  comprehensive  scientific  study  on  the 
environmental risks and benefits of biofuels; and setting a new and more moderate long-
term target, if sustainability cannot be guaranteed.
(EEA 2008b) 
The event was highly unusual as the Scientific Committee normally doesn't issue 
press releases or public statements. In an interview with Spiegel Online, Professor 
Helmut Haberl of the Scientific Committee claimed that the biofuels issue had 
played an increasingly dominant role in the group's regular meetings prior to the 
16 Brazil is for example questioning the compliance of EU's sustainability criteria with WTO rules 
(Jensen 2008), indicating that not all countries acknowledge the EU's right to dictate conditions.
17 The scientific committee assists the EEA management board and the Executive Director in 
providing scientific advice and delivering professional opinion on any scientific matter in the areas 
of work undertaken by the Agency. It does however not assert any real influence over the EEA 
(Petersen 2008).
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statement (Hawley 2008). According to Petersen (2008), the EEA ”let them do it”. 
Lacking a finished report on the issue, it was hard for the EEA to voice a public 
opinion. Letting the Scientific Committee air their feelings was thus ”convenient” 
(Ibid). 
In  the  media,  biofuels  became  increasingly  questioned  as  the  food  prices 
continued to sky-rocket throughout the first half of 2008. In April the World Bank 
estimated that food prices had spiked 83 percent in the last three years and the UN 
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, called biofuels production 
”a crime against humanity” on German radio (Hawley 2008). Unaffordable food 
also led to rioting in Haiti and Cameroon, as well as fuelling a governmental crisis 
in  the  Philippines  (Ibid).  The  food  price  increase  also  sparked  reactions 
throughout Europe. In the UK, Prime Minister Gordon Brown hosted a meeting 
with leading experts to discuss the matter.  Referring to the review of biofuels 
ordered by the British  government (the Gallagher  review),  the Prime Minister 
said: ”If our UK review shows that we need to change our approach, we will also 
push for change in EU biofuels targets.” (Number 10, 2008). 
The Commission however argued that the rising food prices were caused by 
increased demand for food, increased energy and transport costs, poor harvests, a 
historically  low  level  of  stocks,  the  depreciation  of  the  US  dollar,  export 
restrictions  in  a  number  of  traditional  suppliers  to  the  world  market  and 
speculation.  The  fact  that  there  would  be  further  increases  in  the  worldwide 
production  of  biofuels  with  or  without  the  Union's  10  %  target,  meant  that 
Europe would best contribute by showing that a sustainability scheme can work 
(Europa 2008a). 
At this  point of time,  it  was thus external  events,  i.e.  the increase in food 
prices, which provoked reactions and forced the Commission to publicly defend 
its policy proposal. Criticism on behalf of the climate and environment generally 
evoked much less response. Potential harm to people may therefore be more likely 
to affect a policy process than any other potential harms. 
The scientific critique was however reflected in the European Parliament, in 
the Draft Report on the renewable fuels directive presented in May:  
The latest scientific and political evidence have shown that imposing a binding target on 
fuels  for  the  transport  sector  coming  from  biomass  of  10%  cannot  be  achieved  in  a 
sustainable way. This target must therefore be dropped. Sustainable biomass will be more 
efficiently used for other energy purposes such as electricity combined with heat (or cool) 
production. 
(Turmes 2008a: 7)
 
The report continued, claiming that since March 2007 evidence was growing that 
the conditions set out by the Spring European Council18 would not be fulfilled 
(Ibid:  8f).  Social  sustainability  criteria  were  furthermore  suggested,  to  protect 
small farmers of biofuel crops in third world countries (Ibid: 86f).
18 The conditions stated that: "The binding character of this target is appropriate subject to 
production being sustainable, second-generation biofuels becoming commercially available and 
the Fuel Quality Directive being amended accordingly to allow for adequate levels of blending."
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5.3.1 Discussions in the Member States
The discussion in the Council revolved partly around whether the binding nature 
of the biofuels target should be made conditional upon the conditions named in 
2007  (see  footnote  18)  (Council  Presidency  2008:  16).  Italy  for  example, 
proposed an intermediate target of 4 % by 2015, making the remaining 6 % by 
2020 subject to the availability of second generation biofuels (General Secretariat 
of the Council  2008b:  19).  Luxembourg didn't  think the Member States could 
”remain oblivious to recent discussions, even if it is hard to establish precisely 
how far biofuel production is responsible for the food supply crisis” (Ibid: 29). 
Other  issues  concerned how much greenhouse gas  savings  biofuels  should 
have  to  achieve  to  count  towards  the  target.  Denmark  wanted  an  initial 
sustainability requirement of between 35 % and 45 % (General Secretariat of the 
Council  2008a:  6).  Greece  preferred  a  lower  requirement  of  30  %  (General 
Secretariat of the Council 2008b: 14). The UK wanted a savings requirement of 
50 %, stating that  ”It is essential that we take into account the latest scientific 
evidence on biofuel sustainability, particularly about the indirect effects of biofuel 
production” (General Secretariat of the Council 2008a: 11). 
The UK also referred to the upcoming Gallagher review, promising to share 
the results with the other Member States. When the review finally arrived, by the 
end of June, it stated that the proposed 10% by energy target was unlikely to be 
met in a sustainable way. A slowdown in the biofuels production, and an eventual 
shift to targets in terms of greenhouse gas savings, was recommended (Renewable 
Fuels Agency 2008: 8, 10f). A target higher than 4% should only be implemented 
beyond  2013/14  if  biofuels  were  shown  to  be  demonstrably  sustainable  and 
indirect  land-use change avoidable,  with a 2020 target  of between 5 and 8 % 
being appropriate (Ibid: 10f). 
A  10  % target  was  however  not  ruled  out,  as  such  a  trajectory  could  be 
possible  in  the  event  of  new  evidence  and  sufficient  controls  being  globally 
enforced (Ibid: 10). This statement seems to have taken the edge of the criticism, 
as it was possible for the Secretary of State for Transport, Ruth Kelly, to agree 
with the findings of the Gallagher review and still support the EU's 10 % target 
(see House of Commons Hansard 2008).  
The  discussion  among the  Member  States,  thus  indicates  an  awareness  of 
science's voiced concerns, with the UK even commissioning a review of recent 
scientific  findings.  Mostly,  the  debate  however  concerned  the  policy's  details, 
rather  than  its  appropriateness.  It's  therefore  likely  that  national  interests  had 
priority  over  scientific  uncertainties  in  the  Council.  Rising oil  prices  over  the 
summer may have contributed to biofuels' attractiveness for some states, even if 
there is no direct referral to such a motive.
5.3.2 Discussions  in the European Parliament
In the European Parliament, the Committee opinions revealed a more concerned 
view on the biofuels policy.  The Committee on Regional Development was the 
18
only  one  to  be  openly  positive,  suggesting  that  regional  and  local  authorities 
should set an example for the European public by encouraging the use of biofuels 
in  their  vehicles  (Pohjamo  2008:  289).  The  opinion  is  perhaps  not  surprising 
considering the traditional role of transportation for regional development. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hardly mentioned biofuels 
(see:  Velichkova Baeva 2008), while the Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development suggested the 10% target to be non-mandatory, out of concern for 
food prices (Bourzai 2008: 304). The Committee on International Trade proposes 
to delay the date for the 10% target and to introduce a review clause to allow it to 
be revised, depending on the progress of second generation fuels. It was claimed 
that the situation had changed compared to January 2007, with regards to food 
prices and estimations regarding the biofuels' greenhouse gas balance (Glattfelder 
2008:  249ff). The Committee on Tourism and Transport claimed that the 10 % 
target would not be achievable without a massive use of first-generation biofuels, 
which  give  rise  to  major  environmental  and  social  problems.  A  flexible  and 
progressive  approach  was  favoured,  including  the  promotion  of  other  energy 
sources (Ayala Sender 2008: 277). 
The  associated,  and  perhaps  therefore  more  influential,  Committee  on  the 
Environment,  Public  Health  and  Food  Safety  provided  the  lengthiest  opinion, 
stating that while biofuels a few years back were seen as a panacea for a range of 
global energy, environment and rural development issues, today they were widely 
questioned on the grounds of emission savings, adverse pressure on soil, water 
and biodiversity, food security and destruction of rain forests  (Wijkman 2008: 
170f). Interestingly, Wijkman refers to the EU's scientific expert bodies: 
When taking stock of recent scientific reports the uncertainties linked to the expansion of 
biofuels are many. This is the background why both the EEA Scientific Committee as well 
as the JRC went as far as recommending a suspension of the 10% target.
(Ibid: 172)
The  uncertainties,  with  regard  to  land  use  change  and  which  technology  will 
prove more effective in the future, are said to be compelling arguments for caution 
and a step-by-step approach. The Committee therefore suggested a lower target - 
like 8 % - and for regular reviews of the policy and its target to be undertaken 
(Ibid: 173). 
In  September,  the  final  version  of  Turmes  report  was  adopted  by  the 
responsible  ITRE-Committee.  In  this  version  the  10  %  target  was  accepted, 
although an interim target of 5 % by 2015 was suggested, as well as a possibility 
of reviewing the 2020 target on the basis of a review to be completed in 2014. It 
was  also demanded that  the energy efficiency in transport  must  improve until 
2020 by at least 20% compared to 2005, and that 20 % of the 2015 target (i.e. 1 
%) and 40 % of the 2020 target (i.e. 4 %) should be met by more sustainable fuel 
sources,  which  do  not  compete  with  food  production19.  Regarding  the 
19 such as electricity or hydrogen from renewable sources, energy from waste, residues, ligno-
cellulosic biomass or algae, or energy from feedstock grown on degraded land with a net carbon 
benefit regarding land use emissions over 10 years.
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sustainability  criteria,  the  report  proposed  an  initial  requirement  of  45  % 
emissions  savings  compared  to  fossil  fuels,  for  biofuels  to  count  towards  the 
target,  with  indirect  land  use  changes  being  part  of  the  calculations.  This 
requirement would increase to 60 % in 2015. Social sustainability criteria were 
furthermore inserted, including respect for the land rights of local communities 
and  fair  remuneration  of  all  workers  (European  Parliament  The  Legislative 
Observatory  11/09/08, European Parliament 11/09/2008, Turmes 2008b: 7, 10f, 
13, 113, 124f).
Even though the 10 % target was kept, the effects of the amendments were 
substantial.  Taking  account  of  recent  thinking  regarding  alternative  transport 
technologies,  would increase the focus on wind and solar energy while taking 
pressure  off  of  land  as  a  critical  resource  (Petersen  2008).  The  inclusion  of 
indirect land use change in the greenhouse gas saving requirement would give 
most  contemporary  fuels  a  negative  greenhouse  gas  balance,  slowing  down 
production (Ibid). It also shows that the main scientific critique was picked up on. 
Most  draftsmen/women  are  less  explicit  than  Wijkman  about  the  role  of 
scientific  uncertainty in the Committee  opinions,  but  almost  all  of  them show 
signs of being aware of potential risks. Individual MEPs also contacted the EEA 
in search for material and preliminary findings (Ibid).  The suggested changes in 
the means of the policy,  its target and even the target's suspension, add to the 
impression that the 10 % target was seen as problematic and difficult to legitimize 
in the European Parliament. 
5.4 Agreement on a biofuels policy  
During the latter half of 2008, food prices begun to decrease again, taking the 
critical pressure off the biofuels debate. The climate and environment concerns 
were more intact, with a new EEA report, from the 12th of November, stating that 
expansion of bioenergy production can cause adverse effects on the environment, 
jeopardising the achievement of other environmental goals. Domestic resources 
were  recommended  until  global  sustainability  standards  were  in  place  (EEA 
2008a:  5).  Modelling  scenarios  suggested  that  about  7  %  of   the  diesel  and 
gasoline demand in road transport could be filled by bioenergy by 2030 (Ibid: 7). 
In  December,  the  negotiations  between  MEPs  and  the  French  Council 
Presidency intensified,  and an  informal  agreement was  reached on the  11th of 
December, ahead of the Parliament's plenary vote. The consolidated text did not 
pick up on the ITRE Committee's proposals for an interim target, nor for a certain 
percentage  of  the  target  to  be  filled  by  alternative  technologies.  To  promote 
second-generation  biofuels  and  electric  cars  run  on  renewable  energy,  it  was 
instead decided that such input would count double or more towards the target. 
There was no mentioning of a possible revision of the biofuels target on the basis 
of future evaluation (European Parliament 17/12/2008). 
Regarding  the  sustainability  criteria,  the  proposed  emission  savings 
requirement of 35 % was kept and will apply until 2017, when it will be increased 
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to 50-60 %. Indirect land use change is not included in the methodology, but is to 
be addressed in a review by the end of 2010. Social sustainability criteria were 
excluded with referral to WTO rules (General Secretariat of the Council 2008c: 
55, 65, 72). For the Council it was important not to increase the emission savings 
requirement initially, as a 35 % limit would allow most current biofuels to count 
towards the target (Jensen 2008).
According  to  Petersen  (2008),  there  was  an  enormous  pressure  inside  the 
European Parliament to reach an agreement. This is indicated by the fact that the 
legislative resolution  was formally adopted by the European Parliament  on the 
17th of December 2008, with  635 votes in favour, 25 against and 25 abstentions 
(European Parliament 17/12/2008).   
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6. Research question revisited
The research question of this thesis concerns what role scientific uncertainty and 
criticism played during the policy process, whether it affected the outcome, and 
the reasons for this. In this chapter, I will try to summarise the results, clarify 
which  hypothesis  is  supported  by  these  results,  discuss  some  possible 
explanations for this outcome, and suggest areas for further research. 
Following the policy-process, it's quite clear that the EU institutions were not 
isolated from the criticism raised against biofuels. Research institutes and science 
experts were able to transmit knowledge and information through the contribution 
of  reports,  public  statements  and  individual  advice.  The  European  Parliament 
referred  explicitly  to  some  of  these  views  and  findings  in  their  opinions, 
confirming that the transmitted information was taken into consideration. Several 
Member  States  also  mentioned  possible  risks  and uncertainties  referred  to  by 
expertise,  while  the  Commission  thoroughly  developed  impact  assessments  to 
accompany its  legislative  proposals.  The  political  wish to  refer  to  a  scientific 
knowledge  base  for  legitimacy  purposes,  indicated  by  literature,  can  thus  be 
confirmed. Jensen (2008) furthermore believes that the Commission's interest in 
sustainability criteria was influenced by science's voiced concerns. 
In the end however, only the European Parliament suggested changes of the 
policy, referring both to the means of the policy, its  goal and objective.  Even 
though  this  suggests  that  the  first  hypothesis  could  apply  to  one  of  the  EU 
institutions, it would seem that the influence of scientific uncertainty and critique 
was only partly and temporarily successful. The other institutions were not willing 
to let the outcome of the policy process be affected; the changes in the agreed text 
compared to the initial proposal were mere adjustments. It would thus seem that 
scientific  uncertainty  and  criticism was  not  able  to  affect  the  outcome of  the 
policy  process  in  any  substantial  way,  generally  confirming  the  second 
hypothesis. Possible risks to climate and environment were not enough to question 
a policy which was said to also have merits in other areas. The absence of strong 
scientific consensus moreover made it possible to refer to experts, models and 
assessments in support of biofuels, even if some of these sources were critical of a 
high binding biofuels target. Uncertainties and risks could thus be down-played, 
while biofuels were framed as a one-stone-many-birds solution. Socio-economic 
advantages  and  strong  support  among  the  agricultural  community  and  other 
industries, furthermore offered alternative sources of legitimacy for the policy.
There  are  many  possible  answers  to  why the  voiced  uncertainties  did  not 
affect the policy outcome. The financial crisis hitting Europe during the autumn of 
2008, made many Member States  less keen on agreeing to the ambitious,  but 
expensive, climate and energy package. There may have been fears that a change 
of the biofuels policy, would have paved the way for demands for other targets to 
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be re-opened for negotiation. Looming European Parliament elections of 2009, 
and the simultaneous UNFCCC negotiations in  Poznan,  Poland, can also have 
made a quick agreement more attractive. To go back to some of the reasons for 
policy change in chapter 3, further potential explanations could involve the lack of 
developed  alternatives  to  biofuels,  a  lack  of  strategic  leadership  amongst  the 
critics,  and  the  absence  of  any  other  crisis  than  the  food  price  scare,  which 
eventually  proved  to  be  largely  unconnected  to  biofuels.  The  timing  of  the 
scientific critique may also have rendered a successful influence harder. Petersen 
(2008) suggest that science's influence would have been greater if concerns had 
been voiced in an earlier stage. This would confirm findings by Corell (1999), 
who  concluded  that  a  late  involvement  of  scientific  knowledge,  decreased  its 
influence on international negotiations.   
Most  of  these  explanations  would  however  not  explain  the  difference  in 
reactions  between  the  institutions  to  the  transmitted  information.  One  could 
hypothesise that it would have something to do with the difference between the 
institutions themselves. It's for example possible that the European Parliament is 
more sensitive to criticism of environmental nature than the other institutions, as it 
receives part of its legitimacy from a green reputation (see Warleigh 2001: Ch. 5). 
For  the  Member  States  and  Commission,  important  economic  actors,  policy 
stakeholders and national industries, may have been more important sources of 
legitimacy.  This  would  imply  that  it  was  the  area  of  uncertainty,  i.e.  the 
environment  related risks,  that  was  the  reason for  the different  reactions.  The 
implications of this would be that uncertainty in another field, could have had 
more influence and led to a different outcome. The fact that the greatest threat to 
the  biofuels  policy  appears  to  have  been  its  suggested  link  to  rising  food 
commodity prices, implies that possible risk to people and welfare evokes more 
attention and reaction than risk to nature and environment. 
An alternative  idea  would be that  the  view of  science differs  between the 
institutions,  with the  European Parliament  either having,  or  taking on,  a  more 
traditional view of science as speaking truth and therefore being an important ally. 
The other institutions would be expected to be more inclined to regard science as 
a  reservoir  of  causal  stories,  expertise  being  a  source  of  knowledge  and 
legitimacy, but without monopoly on these resources. A stronger position for the 
European Parliament, would in this case lead to a stronger position for science as 
well.
All in all, the reviewed case points to scientific uncertainties during the policy 
process mainly contributing to decreasing the political consensus on the biofuels 
issue.  A stronger  scientific  consensus  regarding  the  detrimental  effects  of  the 
policy could possibly have led to a different result, but as it was, the consensus 
only referred to biofuels being a sub-optimal use of biomass and to the need for 
more research. 
The role played by the media in transmitting scientific findings to the public, 
possibly giving rise to public debate and political pressure, was beyond the scope 
of this thesis to investigate. It's however most likely an important intermediate 
variable, as science would be more influential if its views were advocated by a 
larger number of actors. The relation between science, media and politics would 
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be a possible subjects for further research. Another area for further research would 
be  to  compare  the  influence  of  science  to  that  of  public  and  private  interest 
groups,  and  to  further  investigate  the  importance  of  time and  timing  when  it 
comes to influencing politics.  Questions regarding the importance of scientific 
consensus and regarding what constitutes “consensus”, could also be given more 
attention.  
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7. Conclusion
Science is used by the political sphere as a source of knowledge and legitimacy 
for policy-making. This is not really questioned. What has caused debate is rather 
the issues of whether science is actually listened to or mainly paid lip-service to, 
and whether science should be especially listened to. This thesis does not intend to 
enter the second debate, but its findings would suggest that the answer to the first 
question may be dependent on the type of political actor that is regarded, and what 
source of legitimacy and authority the actor draws upon in its political dealings.
In the EU for example, it would seem that the European Parliament is more 
likely to be influenced by scientific findings in the environmental field, than the 
other  institutions.  The  Commission  must  refer  to  expertise  and  impact 
assessments in its policy proposals, but is also subject to a lot of lobbying and 
required to take stakeholder views into account. Science may therefore not be the 
most important ally, even in areas characterised by research dependence. For the 
Council, it's possible that national interests are given priority. Science could thus 
be influential, if it affected national interests or national public opinions, but may 
also be ignored if  the scientific consensus is  weak and the political  consensus 
strong. Most EU actors will however take in and refer to science in one way or 
another, as it may serve the purpose of legitimizing policy positions. Evidence 
presented to the public will  therefore be partly a  political  product,  rather  than 
completely  scientific.  Hence,  scientific  authority  is  not  openly  challenged  or 
questioned  by  the  political  sphere,  even  if  it's  not  necessarily  believed  in  or 
respected. 
The questioned role of scientific uncertainty was paid attention to in this thesis 
because  of  the  apprehension  that  new  technology  –  aimed  at  rectifying 
scientifically identified problems – may be discovered to cause problems itself 
when applied on a larger scale. Drawing on the insights of the biofuels case, it 
would seem that increased scientific uncertainty regarding a technology is not a 
sufficient  criterion  to  result  in  policy-change.  Scientific  warnings  may  be 
perceived by certain political actors as a reason to change views, and even to seek 
a changed political approach, but this is not a certain reaction. 
From other cases,  it's  known that  strong scientific  consensus regarding the 
existence of environmental problems, can be difficult to argue with politically. 
Most likely, the influence of science regarding single technologies would also be 
stronger if their effects could be proved with more certainty. It's also possible that 
science's influence depends on when it's voiced and what the criticism refers to, 
i.e. what type of risk and to what/whom. It may furthermore matter if a policy is 
intended to achieve more than one objective,  as criticism in one field will  not 
always affect the motives in other areas.
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